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This chapter reviews some key points in the analysis of trust, based on Nooteboom (2002)
i
. 
The following questions are addressed. What can we have trust in? What is the relation 
between trust and control? What are the sources of trust? And what are its limits? By what 
process is trust built up and broken down? What are the psychological mechanisms involved? 
The chapter ends with an illustration of trust in the police.  
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Much has been written about trust, particularly outside economics, in sociology and 
management. In spite of this, much confusion and misunderstanding remains. Trust is full of 
paradox, as listed in Table 2. The purpose of this chapter is to untangle some of the confusion 
and to clarify the complexities of trust. Use is made of a book that has this purpose 
(Nooteboom 2002). This chapter gives a summary and an illustration of some central points, 
and for further details and elaborations reference is made to the book.   
 
------------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
------------------------- 
 
One important source of misunderstanding, related to Paradox 1, is the confusion of trust as 
based on control (on the basis of self-interested behaviour) and trust as going beyond control 
(going beyond narrow self-interest). Can one speak of trust when one believes someone will 
conform to expectations or agreements because he is contractually or hierarchically bound to 
do so, or because it is in his interest to do so, or only if he does so even though he has both the 
opportunity and the incentive not to do so? Or, in other words, can trustworthiness go beyond 
self-interest? And if it does, is it then blind and unconditional? To clarify this, Nooteboom 
(2002) proposed a distinction between a wide notion of reliance, which includes control and 
incentives, and a narrower, stronger notion of trust, which goes beyond self-interest. As noted 
by Williamson (1993), if trust does not go beyond calculative self-interest, i.e. control, it is 
not very meaningful. However, while Williamson argued that such trust cannot survive under 
the pressures of competition in markets, Nooteboom (2002) argued that it can, but that in 
doing so it does have limits, and these limits do depend on pressures of survival. Trust and 
control are substitutes, in that with more trust there can be less control, but they are also 
complements, in that usually trust and contract are combined, since neither can be complete. 
Trust is needed, since contracts can never be complete, but it can go too far, since trust also 
can never be complete. 
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Another source of confusion, related to Paradox 2, is that some see trust as a (trusting) action, 
and then one can speak of people deciding to trust, while others see trust as a mental state, 
which one has or has not, and cannot decide to have. This can easily be resolved right away: 
trust is a state of mind, not an action, but it can lead to trusting action. One may decide to rely 
on someone, even when not having trust in him.  
A third source of confusion concerns what aspect of behaviour one can have trust in, related 
to Paradox 3. One can trust the competence of people to conform to expectations, and their 
intentions to do so, to the best of their competence.  
These confusions tend to invalidate much empirical research on trust, in which these 
distinctions and possible confusions were not taken into account. If, in a survey, one asks all-
encompassing questions whether people trust others, it is left to the respondent to decide 
whether he interprets trust as a state of mind or an acion, as being based on control or sources 
of trustworthiness that go beyond control, and as being directed at competence or at 
intentions. Since different people will make different interpretations, depending on their 
experience, the context and the framing of the question, the results will often be quite 
meaningless. More will be said about this later, with the police as an example.  
A fourth source of confusion, related to Paradoxes 5 and 6, is that there are rational reasons 
for trust as well as emotional causes of it. Both occur, and the question then is how they are 
related. Considerable attention will be paid, in this chapter, to the psychological mechanisms 
of trust. Rational trust is based on information on someone, from which one infers his 
trustworthiness, but such information can hardly be complete, and one can hardly be sure 
about trustworthiness. The person to be trusted (the trustee) probably does not even know 
himself when he may succumb to temptations or pressures of survival. Trust or mistrust are 
also governed by psychological tendencies, feelings and emotions, such as naivity, fear, over-
confidence, impulsiveness, enamouration, etc. Due to the open-endedness and incalculability 
of potential future behaviour, it is of dubious validity to model trust as a (calculable) 
probability (Paradox 6).   
There is often a bias to have too rosy a picture of trust, as being always good, and as going 
together with absence of conflict (Paradoxes 7 and 8). One may trust mistakenly and be open 
to great vulnerability. Trust may be so strong as to limit the flexibility and variety of 
economic relations that may be needed for learning and innovation. Precisely because there is 
trust people may venture into intense conflict, and when that is resolved, trust is likely to 
deepen (Six 2004).   
Finally, trust is not static. While it is needed as the basis for a relationship, it is also shaped by 
it (Paradox 9). Hence, it should be seen as a process.  
To clarify and elaborate on all this, this chapter will review the objects of trust, i.e. things one 
can trust or rely on, sources of reliability and trust, resulting definitions of reliability and trust, 
the value of trust, its psychological mechanisms, its relation to contract, and its limits. As 
noted, all this is derived from Nooteboom (2002), which is referred to for further details. The 
chapter ends with an application to the police, to give an illustration of how the different 
dimensions of trust come together in a specific case. 
 
Objects of trust 
 
Trust entails the acceptance of risk that arises from dependence, combined with lack of 
control. One can trust material objects (e.g. will the car start in the morning), empirical 
regularities or laws of nature (e.g. law of gravity), people, authorities, organizations, 
institutions (e.g. laws), and higher powers (god). When the object of trust (what one trusts) is 
imposed, inevitable, beyond choice, as in the case of laws of nature, higher powers and many 
institutions (e.g. laws), one may speak of confidence rather than trust (Luhmann 1988). If one 
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had trust in a judge, rather than confidence, this would suggest that one avoid judgement or 
select one’s own judge.  
Trust in people or organizations is called ‘behavioural trust’. Behavioural trust has a variety of 
aspects: trust in competence (competence trust), intentions (intentional trust), honesty or 
truthfulness, resource availability, and robustness, i.e. limited sensitivity to outside 
disturbances. Competence trust refers to technical, cognitive, and communicative 
competencies. On the firm level it includes technological, innovative, commercial, 
organizational and managerial competence. Intentional trust refers to the intentions of a 
partner towards the relationship, particularly the presence of opportunism. Opportunism can 
have a passive/weak and an active/strong form. The passive or weak form entails lack of 
dedication or effort to perform to the best of competence. Dedication entails active 
participation, attention, and abstention from free riding. The active or strong form of 
opportunism entails ‘interest seeking with guile’, in the words of Williamson (1975), with 
lying, stealing, and cheating to expropriate advantage from a partner. Absence of such strong 
opportunism is called ‘benevolence’ or ‘goodwill’. Thus, intentional trust has two dimensions: 
trust in dedication and trust in benevolence.  
In fact, the aspects of trust can be extended further. A systematic way of doing this is to ask 
and answer the question what kinds of things can go wrong in a relationship. Nooteboom 
(2002) did this on the basis of a multiple causality of action, derived from Aristotle.   
Like people, organizations can be the object of trust, in both their competence and their 
intentions. We can trust an organization to behave responsibly, regarding its stakeholders and 
the environment. Of course an organization itself does not have an intention, but it has 
interests and can try to regulate the intentions of its workers to serve those interests. One’s 
trust in an individual may be based on one’s trust in the organization he belongs to, e.g. because 
the organization has an interest in maintaining its reputation or brand name. Trust in an 
organization can be based on trust in the people in it. It can be affected by corporate 
communication, which aims to project a certain image. Trust in people and in organization are 
connected by the functions and positions people have and the roles they play in their 
organizations (Ring and van de Ven 1994). For personal trust to be transferred to the 
organization, trustworthy individuals must be backed up by their authority, position, bosses 
and personnel. Vice versa, for organizational trust to be transferred to individuals, the people 
involved should implement organizational interests and rules of trustworthy conduct. 
 
Trust and control 
 
Here, the focus is on intentional trust. In much literature, the explicit or implicit definition of 
intentional trust is a broad one: the trustor (A) trusts the trustee (B) if A accepts relational 
risk, i.e. vulnerability to (active or passive) opportunistic actions of B, but expects that B will 
not in fact engage in such behaviour. In such a broad interpretation of the notion of trust, it 
would include ‘control’, defined as any instrument or condition that may mitigate relational 
risk. Control is often interpreted more narrowly as ‘deterrence’ (Shapiro et al. 1992, Maguire 
et al. 2001): in case of opportunistic behaviour the partner would incur a penalty or a material 
loss. From Nooteboom (1996, 2002) the idea is adopted that there are three ways in which 
opportunism can be mitigated: 
1. opportunity control: limitation of opportunities for opportunism, by restricting the 
range of a partner’s actions, by contract or hierarchical supervision 
2. incentive control: limitation of material incentives to utilise opportunities for 
opportunism, due to dependence on the relationship, hostages or reputation effects 
3. benevolence or goodwill: limitation of inclinations towards opportunism, on the basis 
of social norms or personal relations   
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Deterrence would include opportunity control and incentive control. Benevolence or goodwill 
goes beyond deterrence, with more intrinsic motives to limit opportunism.  
 
Sources of reliability 
 
Trust has rational reasons, based on inference of trustworthiness, and psychological causes, 
which block, affect or enable rational evaluation. For rational trust, based on inference of 
trustworthiness, we need to know what the sources of trustworthiness are. I adopt, with some 
modifications, a scheme from Nooteboom (2002), which was in turn adopted, with 
modifications, from Williams (1998), specified in Table 2. 
 
------------------------- 
Table 2 about here 
------------------------- 
 
Following Williams (1988), Table 1 distinguishes between ‘macro’ sources, which apply 
generally and impersonally, apart from any specific exchange relation, and ‘micro’ sources. The 
first arise from the institutional environment of laws, norms, values, standards, and agencies for 
their enforcement. They yields ‘institution-based trust’. They are also called sources of ‘thin’ 
trust. This kind of trust requires that we trust those institutions to support or enforce 
trustworthiness of people and organizations. The ‘micro’ sources arise in specific relations, and 
are therefore personalised. They are also called sources of ‘thick’ trust. The distinction between 
macro and micro sources is also known as the distinction between ‘universalistic’ or 
‘generalised’ sources versus ‘particularistic’ sources, made by Deutsch (1973: 55), and between 
impersonal, institutional, and personalised sources made by Shapiro (1987) (see also Bachmann 
2000). This distinction goes back to the work of Parsons. Social norms and moral obligations, 
including a sense of duty, following Parsons and Durkheim, were proposed more recently by 
Bradach and Eccles (1984), Zucker (1986), and Dore (1983), among others. Fukuyama (1995) 
employed the term of ‘spontaneous sociability’.  
Williams further distinguished self-interested and altruistic or ‘other-directed’ sources of co-
operation. The self-interested sources are associated with the notions of deterrence and 
‘calculus-based trust’ (e.g. Lewicki and Bunker 1996). In my reconstruction, taken from 
Nooteboom (2002), this includes opportunity control and incentive control. Limitation of 
opportunities has an ‘outside form’, to control outside partners, in contract enforcement. It 
also has an ‘inside form’, within an organization, in the exercise of ‘hierarchy’, with 
managerial ‘fiat’ under an employment relationship. Both entail monitoring of behaviour, to 
detect cheating as a cause for sanctions. The distinction between external contracts and 
internal hierarchy lies at the basis of the reasoning of transaction cost economics (TCE). In 
view of uncertainty and the consequent impossibility of complete contingent contracts, and 
the fact that with external contracting sanctions ultimately can only be imposed through the 
external authority of the law, internal control by hierarchy yields more opportunities to 
demand information for monitoring and to impose sanctions, under the general conditions of 
an employment relation.  
In incentive control, partner B behaves well towards A because he is dependent on A for one 
or more of the following reasons: A has a unique, difficult to replace value to B, B faces 
switching costs as a result of relation-specific investments, partner A holds a hostage from B, 
or B has to protect his reputation. The notion of specific investments is derived from TCE, 
except that I consider the relation rather than the transaction as the unit of analysis, and hence 
speak of relation-specific, not transaction-specific investments. I extend the notion of specific 
investments to include investments in relation-specific mutual understanding and in the 
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building of relation-specific trust. The notion of hostage is also taken from TCE. It mostly 
takes the form of sensitive information that is of value to B, and is held by A, who can 
destroy, divulge or transfer it to a competitor of B, if B does not behave well. A hostage can 
also take the form of a minority share that A has in B, with the (typically implicit) threat of 
selling the shares to a firm that aims to take over B. It may also take the form of specialised 
staff of B, temporarily stationed at A, who could be poached by A
ii
. 
Calculation of self-interest includes reputation (Weigelt and Camerer 1988) and the assessment 
of future benefits of present cooperativeness (‘shadow of the future’), as has been recognised by 
many (Telser 1980, Axelrod 1984, Hill 1990, Heide and Meiner 1992, Parkhe 1993). A 
reputation mechanism requires reporting and broadcasting of non-trustworthy behaviour. To 
forestall mere gossip, this often requires some agency to make reliable reports or to check their 
validity. This can be a trade, industry or professional association.    
The ‘altruistic’ or ‘other-directed’ sources go beyond self-interested behaviour. Man is not only 
self-interested and opportunistic: in business also common honesty and decency are found 
(Macaulay 1963). This can yield voluntary compliance to an agreement that goes beyond self-
interest (Bradach and Eccles 1989). This may be based on established, socially inculcated 
norms and values (macro), and empathy, identification, affect and routines developed in specific 
relations (micro). The first includes pressures of allegiance to groups one belongs to, or values 
and norms inculcated by socialization into those groups. On the micro side, empathy-based trust 
entails that one knows and understands how partners think and feel. It allows one to assess 
strengths and weaknesses in competence and intentions, to determine the limits of 
trustworthiness under different conditions (Nooteboom 2002). Identification-based trust goes 
further: it entails that people think and feel in the same way, sharing views of the world and 
norms of behaviour. This may lead to affect- and friendship-based trust. 
Routine-based trust, proposed by Nooteboom (2002), entails that when a relation has been 
satisfactory for a while, awareness of opportunities of opportunism, for oneself and for the 
partner, is relegated to ‘subsidiary awareness’ (Michael Polanyi). One takes the relation for 
granted and does not continuously think about opportunities to gain extra advantage. 
As relations develop in time partners begin to understand each other better (empathy), and may 
then develop identification-based trust (McAllister 1995, Lewicki and Bunker 1996), and 
routine-based trust. This constitutes a relation-specific ‘trust process’. Identification may go so 
far that one is not able or willing to consider the possibility of untrustworthiness. This may 
include cognitive dissonance: one does not want to face evidence of untrustworthiness 
because it conflicts with deep-seated convictions or feelings. Routine-based and 
identification-based trust can become excessive, causing rigidity of relations and blocking 
innovation. 
The trust literature employs the notion of ‘knowledge based trust’, which is also proposed as a 
stage in trust building (McAllister 1995, Lewicki and Bunker 1996). I find this a vague and 
confusing notion (Nooteboom 2002). Opportunity control (contracts), incentive control 
(dependence, hostages, reputation) and empathy are all based on knowledge of, respectively, the 
terms of a contract, the law and possible sanctions, uniqueness of partner value, hostage 
keeping, reputation, of how a partner thinks.   
 
Definition of trust 
 
The question now is whether we should adopt the wide definition of trust, indicated before, 
which would include deterrence (opportunity and incentive control) as sources of trust. Like 
Williams, many other authors have claimed that trust can go beyond deterrence, on the basis 
of ‘goodwill’ or ‘benevolence’, resulting from loyalty or altruism (Das and Teng 1998, 
Maguire et al. 2001, Lane and Bachmann 2000). Deterrence is felt to be foreign to the notion 
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of trust: ‘genuine’ trust is based on other, more social and personal foundations of 
trustworthiness. Maguire et. al. (2001: 286) claimed that if we do not include the latter, we 
conflate trust and power. As Williamson (1993) indicated, trust has no meaning if it does not 
go beyond calculative self-interest. 
For these reasons, trust has been defined more narrowly as the expectation that a partner will 
not engage in opportunistic behaviour, even in the face of opportunities and incentives for 
opportunism (Bradach and Eccles 1984, Chiles and McMackin 1996, Nooteboom 1996). This 
narrower definition is felt to indicate better what most people would call ‘real trust’. As 
suggested by Nooteboom (2002), this problem of definition has been and still is a source of 
major confusion and misunderstanding. Perhaps we should use different terms for the 
different notions: ‘reliance’ for the wide notion, including deterrence, and ‘real trust’ or ‘trust 
in the strong sense’ for trust that goes beyond deterrence, in benevolence. 
 
The value of trust 
 
Trust can have extrinsic value, as a basis for achieving social or economic goals. It can also 
have intrinsic value, as a dimension of relations that is valued for itself, as part of a broader 
notion of well-being or the quality of life. Many authors have pointed this out. People may 
prefer, as an end in itself, to deal with each other on the basis of trust. Most economists tend to 
think of value in exchange as something that exists independently from the transaction. As 
formulated by Murakami & Rohlen (1992: 70): ‘The value of the relationship itself is typically 
ignored and the impersonality of the transaction is assumed’. In intrinsic utility, the exchange 
process itself matters, as does the economic surplus that the exchange yields. 
When intrinsic, the value of trust can be hedonic or based on self-respect. Many people would 
prefer to have trust-based relations rather than relations based on suspicion and opportunism for 
hedonic reasons. For most people it is more agreeable or pleasurable to have friendly relations 
than to have to deal with animosity and suspicion. There is also an intrinsic motive of self-
respect, based on adherence to internalised norms or values of decent or ethical conduct. There 
is also a more socially oriented motive, in the will to be recognised, valued and respected by 
others. Social recognition may be served by accumulating riches, power or glamour, but also by 
being trustworthy and trusting, and thereby demonstrating adherence to established values, 
norms or habits of behaviour. This may merge with the earlier motive of self-respect, while 
analytically it can still be distinguished. Fukuyama (1995: 358) traced the urge for recognition 
to Hegel: a struggle for recognition, ‘that is, the desire of all human beings to have their essence 
as free, moral beings recognised by other beings’. As indicated, this does not necessarily lead to 
trustworthiness and trust. Philosophers have also postulated other urges, such as the will to 
power. The extrinsic, economic value of trust lies in the fact that it enables interaction between 
people and between organizations and can reduce transaction costs. The downside of trust is 
that it entails risk and can be betrayed, which may endanger the survival of a person or firm. 
There can also be too much solidarity, providing an obstacle to change and innovation. 
The distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic value is analytical. They are not necessarily 
perceived as distinct. An important question is how they are related in the perception and 
behaviour of agents. Extrinsic value is instrumental, which entails calculation, and suggests a 
focus on self-interest, while intrinsic value can be non-rational, unreflective and other-directed. 
The question concerning their relation is related to questions whether and how calculative and 






Trust entails acceptance of relational risk. This may be based on a rational evaluation of 
trustworthiness. However, such evaluation is mediated by decision heuristics, and next to 
rational evaluation trust is also based on instinct, inclinations, feelings and emotions. 
Evolutionary psychology suggests that a tendency towards ‘give and take’ (reciprocity), and 
accepting relational risk, is ‘in our genes’, since it was conducive to survival in the ancient 
hunter-gatherer societies in which humanity evolved. The variance of yields, in gathering 
edible plants, roots, nuts, etc., and the even greater variance in hunting, together with 
problems of durable storage, entails an evolutionary advantage of the willingness to surrender 
part of one’s yield to others in need, in the expectation to receive from them when they are 
successful (Cosmides and Tooby 1992: 212). This would solve the problem, often noted in the 
literature, how in a sequential game of give and take the first move of giving, and thereby 
making a risky pre-commitment, is made (Simmel 1978, Luhmann 1979). The evolutionary 
argument suggests that we do this instinctively. However, psychological mechanisms that 
were conducive to survival in evolution do entail biases that can lead to serious error 
(Bazerman 1998). 
Here we should no longer talk of reasons but of causes of trust. However, the distinction I am 
making here may suggest a greater cleavage between rationality and emotion than is valid. Like 
many others, I believe that rationality and emotions are intertwined (Polanyi 1962, Merleau-
Ponty 1964, Damasio 1995, Hendriks-Jansen 1996, Lakoff and Johnson 1999). I include in 
cognition not only perception and interpretation but also evaluation, i.e. value judgements. Not 
only value judgements but also interpretations and even perceptions are emotion-laden. In the 
interpretive or hermeneutic view, our knowledge is constructed in mental categories, which 
include psychological mechanisms that may yield serious distortion. 
Nevertheless, we can distinguish more or less rational inference of trustworthiness from less 
reflective causes of trust, based on affect of friendship or kinship, or on routinised behaviour. I 
follow Herbert Simon (1983) in recognizing the role of emotions in reason, to shift routinised 
behaviour from subsidiary to focal awareness. Emotions are rational in triggering reflexes or 
attention when survival requires it. However, they can yield error. They may lead us to jump to 
erroneous conclusions, and may produce prejudice. Evidence of untrustworthiness may be 
ignored as a result of cognitive dissonance. As Deutsch (1973: 159) put it: 
 
A person’s perceptions of another will be determined not only by the information he 
receives from his direct experiences or from what others tell him, but also by his need to 
absorb this information in such a way as to prevent disruption of existing perceptions, 




Social psychology offers a number of insights into the decision heuristics that people use. In a 
survey, Bazerman (1998) mentions the following heuristics: 
- Availability heuristic: people assess the probability and likely causes of an event by the degree 
to which instances of it are ‘readily available’ in memory, i.e. are vivid, laden with emotion, 
recent and recognizable. Less available events and causes are neglected. 
- Representativeness heuristic: the likelihood of an event is assessed by its similarity to 
stereotypes of similar occurrences. We recognise something according to the likeness of some 
focal features to those of a prototype, which may be a stereotype, and on the basis of that 
attribute other features from the stereotype that are not in fact present. This can easily yield 
prejudice. 
- Anchoring and adjustment. Judgement is based on some initial or base value (‘anchor’) from 
previous experience or social comparison, plus incremental adjustment from that value. People 
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have been shown to stay close even to random anchors that bear no systematic relation to the 
issue at hand. First impressions can influence the development of a relation for a long time.  
One cannot maintain that these heuristics are irrational. In view of uncertainty and bounded 
rationality they may well be adaptive, i.e. contribute to survival. Concerning the availability 
heuristic, note the importance of an emotion-laden perception of a suspicious event to trigger 
awareness of the routine and subject it to scrutiny, in focal awareness. Perhaps this is connected 
with the availability heuristic: we pay attention only when triggers are emotion laden. If we did 
not apply such filters our consciousness would likely be overloaded. 
The representativeness heuristic is related to the role of prototypes in language and 
categorization. Since definitions can seldom offer necessary and sufficient conditions for 
categorization, and meaning is context-dependent and open-ended, allowing for variation and 
change, we need prototypes (Rosch 1978). A prototype represents an exemplar of a class that 
connects others in the class. Class membership is decided on the basis of resemblance to a 
salient case, or a typical case, which serves as a prototype. A prototype may turn into a 
shallow stereotype. However, the mechanism of attributing unobserved characteristics upon 
recognition of observed ones enables pattern recognition that is conducive to survival. 
Concerning anchoring and adjustment, under uncertainty cognition does need such an anchor, 
and taking the most recent value of a variable, or a value observed in behaviour of people in 
similar conditions, with whom one can empathize, may well be rational. Trust can be seen as a 
default, in the sense that on the basis of past experience we assume trustworthiness unless we 
find new evidence that contradicts it. We adapt past guidelines for behaviour on the basis of 
new evidence. Incremental adjustment can be inadequate, but so can fast adjustment. Studies of 
learning and adjustment have shown that hasty and large departures from existing practices can 
yield chaotic behaviour (March 1991, Lounamaa  and March 1987). Thus anchoring and 
adaptation may also be a useful and justified heuristic, in view of uncertainty. Nevertheless, 
these heuristics can yield errors.  
The relevance of these heuristics to trust is clear, because they affect, or enable, expectation and 
attribution of trustworthiness. According to the heuristics, one would develop expectations, 
explain broken expectations, and attribute trustworthiness according to what is ‘available’ in the 
mind, stereotypes, existing norms or recent experience.   
Another psychological phenomenon is that people are found to have difficulty to choose 
between immediate gratification and long-term benefit, yielding a problem of ‘the weakness of 
the will’. This has been explained in terms of people having multiple selves that are at odds with 
each other, or as a visceral drive competing with a rational inclination. Another interpretation 
follows the availability heuristic: immediate gratification is more ‘available’. Studies of 
behaviour under uncertainty have shown that people may assess delay in gratification 
differently when it is near than when it is far ahead, and that sometimes discounting seems to 
take place not according to an exponential but according to a hyperbolic function. According to 
that function, the negative utility of a delay of gratification increases as the decision moves to 
the present. As a result, preferences may reverse at some point in time. The relevance of this 
phenomenon to collaborative relations is also clear, in the trade-off between loyalty to a partner, 
which may be in one’s long-term interest, and the temptation to defect to another partner who 
offers more advantage in the short term. One may honestly think one is able to withstand that 
temptation in the future, and succumb to it when it nears. Again, we cannot unequivocally judge 
that this psychological mechanism is maladaptive. As noted also by Bazerman (1998), the 
impulse of temptation may also entail the vision of entrepreneurial opportunity, and too much 





‘Prospect theory’ (Kahneman et. al.) has demonstrated that people are not risk-neutral, but can 
be risk-taking when a decision is framed in terms of loss, and risk-averse when it is framed in 
terms of gain. Framing entails, among other things, that in a relation people will accept a greater 
risk of conflict when they stand to incur a loss than when they stand to obtain a benefit. Related 
to this effect is the ‘endowment effect’: people often demand more money to sell what they 
have than they would be prepared to pay to get it. In the first case one wants to cover for loss.  
This may contribute to loyalty and stable relations, as follows. Relations typically end when one 
of the partners encounters a more attractive alternative, while the other partner wants to 
continue the relation. The first partner is confronted with a gain frame, the second with a loss 
frame. This may cause the second partner to engage in more aggressive, risky behaviour, to 
maintain the relation, than the first partner, who may be more willing to forego his profit and 
run less risk of a harmful separation procedure. One wonders what the adaptive rationale of this 
difference between a gain- and a loss-frame is, if any. Perhaps it lies precisely in the effect just 
mentioned: it reduces defection and thereby stabilises relationships, which may have 
contributed to survival.
iii
  However, this is only conjecture on my part.  
Earlier, I noted the importance for trust of empathy and identification, yielding the ability to 
dwell in (empathy) or share (identification) others’ categories of understanding and motivations, 
as a function of conditions. Recall the definition of trust, above, as a four-place predicate: one 
trusts someone in some respect under certain conditions. It is part of trust, then, to understand 
another’s cognition and motivation, as a function of conditions, in knowledge-based trust, to 
sympathize with them in empathy-based trust, or identify with them in identification-based 
trust. This is clearly related to the availability heuristic: ‘availability’ increases to the extent that 
one can understand behaviour, and sympathize or identify with it, or, on the contrary, abhor it. 
This affects both one’s own trustworthiness, in the willingness to make sacrifices for others, and 
one’s trust, in the tolerance of behaviour that deviates from expectations. One will more easily 
help someone when one can identify with his need. One can more easily forgive someone’s 
breach of trust or reliance when one can sympathize or identify with the lack of competence or 
the motive that caused it. One can more easily accept the blame for oneself. One may 
sympathize with his action, seeing perhaps that his action was in fact a just response to one’s 
own previous actions. Empathy and identification are both forms of affect-based trust, but in the 
latter affect is the strongest.  
Another reason to attribute blame to oneself when someone else is in fact to blame, is to reduce 
uncertainty or establish a sense of control. This works as follows. If it is perceived to be 
impossible or very difficult to influence someone’s behaviour in order to prevent or redress 
damage from broken expectations, one may attribute blame to oneself. By doing that, one 
relieves the stress of feeling subjected to the power of others. For people with little self-
confidence or a low self-image, this is a move of desperation, and self-blame fits with the 
preconception one had of oneself. For people with self-confidence, self-blame may yield a sense 
of control: if the cause lies with oneself, one can more easily deal with it. Of course, that may be 
an illusion, due to overconfidence in oneself.   
Another mechanism is that of a belief in a just world, which gives reassurance. By enacting 
justice, even anonymously, one confirms its existence by contributing to it, and thereby 
maintains a sense of security. However, when the sacrifice for another would be too high to 
accept, in the view of self-interest, then to avoid a self-perception of callousness one may 
convince oneself that his hardship is his own fault. 
Yet another psychological mechanism is that in violation of rational behaviour sunk costs, such 
as sacrifices made in a relationship, are not seen as bygones that should be ignored in an 
assessment of future costs and benefits. They are seen as sacrifices that would be seen as in vain 
if one pulls out after having incurred them. This yields what is known as ‘non-rational 
escalation of commitment’. It is associated with cognitive dissonance: cutting one’s losses and 
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pulling out would entail an admission of failure, of having made a bad decision in the past. The 
phenomenon is confirmed in empirical research, which shows that when the decision to cut 
one’s losses needs to be made by someone not involved in the initial decision, or when the 
threat of an admission of failure is removed, the rational decision to pull out is made. Again, 
one cannot say that this mechanism is always bad, because it also demonstrates perseverance in 
the face of setbacks, which can be a good thing, and is in fact a trait of many a successful 
innovating entrepreneur. This phenomenon can also be connected with the effect of a loss frame 
versus a gain frame, proposed in prospect theory. The person, or group, that made the initial 
decision experiences a loss frame, with the inclination to accept further risk in order to prevent 
acceptance of the loss. The decision maker who enters fresh experiences a gain frame, to make 
a decision that will offer profit in the future, regardless of past sunk costs, and will be less 
inclined to accept the high risk of continuing losses from sticking to past decisions. The 
mechanism of non-rational escalation can contribute to the continuation of a relationship where 
it is not beneficial. 
 
Trust and contract: substitutes or complements? 
 
How are trust and contract related? Are they complements or substitutes? If we interpret trust 
in the wide sense of reliance, it can be based on the assurance offered by contracts. Contract 
supports reliance. On the other hand, some social scientists argue that contract can be 
destructive of trust in the stronger, narrower sense. Unwanted side effects result mainly from 
the active use of contract in monitoring activities, threat or litigation, in other words 
deterrence. Such actions are argued to evoke conflict (Gaski 1984, Hunt and Nevin 1974, 
Lusch 1976), opportunism (Goshal and Moran 1996), and defensive behavior (Zand 1972; 
Hirschman 1984). As a result more coercion will have to be used (Goshal and Moran 1996), or 
in the words of  Deutsch (1973: 88): ‘Without the other’s trust as an asset, power is essentially 
limited to the coercive and ecological (i.e. conditional) types, the types that require and 
consume most in the way of physical and economic resources’. As a result, they argue that it 
may not always be desirable to specify and enforce a contract. The negative effects may not 
only materialise in the present, but also in future relationships. If a case is taken to court, the 
plaintive could seriously jeopardize a future relationship with that partner. If few alternative 
partners are available, the opportunity costs of this may be very high. Also, litigation may 
affect reputation thereby jeopardizing potential future relations with others. Here, contract and 
trust are substitutes, or ‘opposing alternatives’ (Knights et al. 2001: 314). 
I propose that some of these differences of opinion are only apparent, and are due to different 
interpretations of the notion of trust. If the argument is that trust in the wide sense of 
‘reliance’ may be based on contract, this can be quite consistent with the argument that 
detailed contract specification and strict enforcement is in conflict with trust in ‘the strong 
sense’, going beyond control.   
But even after correction for such misunderstanding, trust and contact can still be seen as both 
complements and substitutes. If one accepts that due to uncertainty about future contingencies 
of contract execution contracts cannot be complete, especially in innovation, at some point 
one has to seek recourse to trust (in some sense). Trust, one might say loosely, begins where 
contract necessarily ends. Thus, they are complements. On the other hand, intuition tells us 
that when trust is large, contracts can be limited. Thus they are substitutes. 
Klein Woolthuis et al. (2005) conducted an empirical, longitudinal investigation of the 
relation between trust and contract during the evolution of collaborative projects in 
innovation, and found evidence for both substitution and complementarity. One finding, in 
favour of substitution, was in line with the argument of Lewicki and Bunker that first risk is 
mitigated by contracts, which later, as empathy develops, are replaced by trust. Another 
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finding, in favour of complementarity, was that contracts may be extensive and complex 
under high trust for purely practical reasons of coordination in complex projects, or in other 
words for reasons of competence trust rather than intentional trust. Also, the drafting of a 
complex contract itself constitutes a relation-specific investment, which one does not want to 
engage in until sufficient trust has developed to make it likely to be worthwhile.       
 
Limits of trust 
 
Several authors suggest that goodwill does not operate independently from self-interest. 
Bachmann (in Lane and Bachmann 2000: 303) proposed that trust is a hybrid phenomenon, 
including both calculation and goodwill. According to Williamson (1993) it is impossible to 
reliably judge possible limits to other people’s opportunism. Williamson claimed that if trust 
goes beyond calculative self-interest (in ‘real trust’), it inevitably yields blind, unconditional 
trust, which is unwise and will not survive in markets. Pressures of survival under competition 
force firms to take advantage of others whenever they have the opportunity. In contrast, many 
social scientists maintain that such trust is viable, without necessarily becoming blind or 
unconditional, and is indeed pervasive, also in markets (Gambetta 1988, Helper 1990, 
Murakami and Rohlen 1992, Dyer and Ouchi 1993, Ring and Van de Ven 1994, Gulati 1995, 
McAllister 1995, Chiles and McMackin 1996, Nooteboom 1996, Nooteboom et al. 1997).  
While in contrast with Williamson I maintain that trust beyond calculative self-interest can be 
viable, I agree that blind, unconditional trust is generally unwise, in markets. There are 
generally limits to trustworthiness and trust. While trust is not always calculative, it is 
nevertheless constrained by possibilities of opportunism (Pettit 1995). Even the most loyal, 
committed and dedicated of people may succumb to the temptation of golden opportunities or 
pressures of survival. Firms may be subject to competitive pressure to such an extent that they 
cannot afford to accept any sacrifice for the sake of loyalty. Therefore, there are limits within 
which people and firms may be worthy of real trust (Pettit 1995, Nooteboom 2002). 
One way to model trustworthiness is in terms of a limited resistance to temptation towards 
opportunism. This may be modelled as a threshold for defection: one does not 
opportunistically defect until the advantage one can gain with it exceeds the threshold. This 
threshold may depend on implicit or explicit norms of conduct, and on competitive pressure. 
It is likely to adapt as a function of experience (Nooteboom and Gorobets 2004). Trust may 
then be modelled as based on a perception or assumption of such a constraint on a partner’s 
opportunism.  
Trust, being associated with risk of things going wrong, is challenged when things do go 
wrong, or when ‘trouble’ arises (Six 2004). This does not necessarily entail a breakdown of 
trust. The question to be asked is why things went wrong. This could be due to outside 
accidents beyond anyone’s control, a mistake, lack of competence, lack of effort, or 
opportunism. How does one assess what is the case? What motive and competence will one 
infer and attribute to the trustee, and what implications for action will one derive? An 
opportunistic partner would not admit his opportunistic motive, and will claim ‘force 
majeure’, if he can get away with that. This yields an argument for openness in trust relations 
(cf. Zand 1972), and the use of ‘voice’ (Hirschman 1970, Helper 1990): it may be better to 
admit a mistake, and timely so, in order to have the best chance of redressing it, than to run 
the risk of one’s action being seen as a sign of opportunism (Nooteboom 2002).  
Summing up, trust is a four-place predicate (Nooteboom 2002): A trustor (1) trusts a trustee 
(2) in some respects (3), under some conditions (4). We generally do not trust different people 
equally, we may trust a person in some respects, but not in others, and we often trust people in 
some conditions but not in others. Trust generally has its limits because trustworthiness 
generally has its limits 
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Trust by citizens in the police is of crucial importance for the legitimacy of the police itself, 
but also for external reasons: without such trust, people may lose trust in society more widely, 
and may be tempted to take the law into their own hands. Trust in the police is needed to 
maintain state monopoly of violence. The case of the police illustrates a number of features of 
trust. First, it illustrates the multi-level nature of trust. Trust in the police requires trust in 
individual officers as well as in police organization and underlying institutions of law and law 
enforcement, and these levels of trust should support each other. Mistrust in the police may 
spill over into mistrust of the social or political system as a whole. Conversely, lack of trust in 
politicians, or in a minister of justice, or in an interior minister, may spill over into mistrust in  
the police.   
Surveys indicate that in the Netherlands citizens generally trust the police in their intentions 
but less in their competence. That is far from ideal, but it is much better than the reverse, with 
a competently corrupt police.  
First, let us consider competence trust. That requires, first of all, that it is clear, to citizens and 
to the police itself, what can be expected of the police, and what the priorities are. What are 
the priorities of ‘catching criminals’, traffic control, protection, aid in disaster, and 
community service? How do people assess competence in each? Police service is partly an 
experience good, in which quality is assessed during the experience of direct contact, and 
partly a credence good, where the citizen is incompetent to judge quality even after contact.  
To the extent that competence cannot be judged, there is displacement from real but unknown 
factors to observable proxy indicators, such as the crispness of an officer’s uniform, his 
manner and speech, and generally the authoritativeness that the officer exhibits, in calmness 
and self-confidence. When quality is difficult to judge, one will also seek judgement on the 
basis of outside information, such as gossip, reports in the media, or communications (e.g. on 
percentages of crimes solved) from the police itself. Public media may be biased, tending to 
report more on failures than on successes. Self-reports from the police may be suspect. As 
noted before, a reputation mechanism may require an independent agency to give trusted 
information (Shapiro 1987).     
Next, let us consider intentional trust. Table 1 can be used as a tool for the analysis and design 
of its sources. Police officers are constrained in opportunities for opportunism by legal 
governance and bureaucratic control, but the effectiveness of this is limited by constrained 
opportunities for monitoring of the policeman’s conduct in the field. Monitoring and reporting 
by colleagues out in the field is limited by an ethic of mutual solidarity, needed for thick trust 
between officers, for mutual support under hazardous conditions. Incentive control is limited 
by one-sided dependence of the citizen on the policeman with his monopoly on violence: the 
citizen has limited opportunity for retaliation. Since one cannot choose to dodge the police, 
and one has no choice of officer, we may need to speak of confidence rather than trust. 
Attempts have been made to establish some countervailing power in the form of complaint 
procedures, which also enable a reputation mechanism. The force of reputation may be further 
enhanced by embedding a policeman in a local community, to yield a ‘shadow of the future’. 
Building up understanding and reputation entails relation- or community-specific investments 
that will only be undertaken when there is a perspective of a more or less durable relationship. 
Nevertheless, a fundamental asymmetry of dependence remains. Since instruments of both 
opportunity and incentive control have limited force, sources beyond self-interest are needed 
as a complement, in ‘real’ trustworthiness. One is the force of norms of conduct, which 
should dominate self-interest. This is, of course, what we call integrity. Another is empathy 
and routinization in relations. In routinization fair conduct has become a habit. Empathy 
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entails that an officer should view the execution of his task from the perspective of the citizen. 
While sticking to legal and professional norms, the officer should try to act and explain his 
actions in forms that fit the intellectual and cultural ‘absorptive capacity’ of the citizen. Of 
course, one cannot expect that the citizen concurs with punitive action, but he should at least 
understand what is happening and what motivates police action. In terms of the social 
psychological analysis conducted above, the officer should try to link with the citizen’s 
repertoire of categories, and, if possible, to construe his own action as an adjustment with 
respect to the citizen’s cognitive anchors, or to help citizens in the construction of adequate 
categories. There is an enormous potential here for the police to help prevent 
misunderstanding and grudges among foreigners and to aid in their integration in society. This 
is aided by a multi-cultural police force. 
When empathy develops into identification it may go too far, with the officer compromising 
on the rules and norms out of identification with local citizen interests. Then, he may have to 
be moved elsewhere. Thus, citizen relationships need to sufficiently durable to encourage 
investment in understanding and trust, but not so long as to yield excessive identification.      
In most activities in markets, agents are in a gain frame: they stand to profit from market 
exchange. A significant feature of police work is that citizens typically find themselves in a 
loss frame: the criminal stands to lose his freedom and opportunity of criminal gain, and 
citizens are mostly encountered when they stand to lose personal safety or property. Hence, 
the force of emotions, in the availability heuristic, is high. Threats of safety or property are 
likely to evoke mental frames of strong self-preservation, in flight, fight, revenge, panic, and 
the like. The police officer should help to defuse the emotions involved. Emotions under the 
threat of loss detract from the reliability of citizen reports and complaints, reducing their 
worth as a means of governance (see above). All the more important it is, in such emotion-
laden conditions, for the officer to keep his cool, confidence, authority, fairness and empathy.   
In sum, sources of reliability of the police are limited: hierarchical control is limited due to  
limits of monitoring, a highly one-sided dependence of citizens, limited opportunities for trust 
based on ongoing personal relations and routinised behaviour, while emotions and suspicions 
may run high due to citizens typically being in a loss frame. Thus, reliability has to be based 
on legal control, procedures of accountability, press scrutiny to support a reputation 




The notion of trust is filled with confusion and misunderstanding. One has to carefully 
distinguish between levels of trust: personal, organizational and institutional. Ideally, different 
levels of trust are mutually supporting: trust in people should be consistent with trust in the 
organization where they work, and should be supported by surrounding institutions. One has 
to distinguish between trust in different aspects of behaviour, particularly between trust in 
competence and trust in intentions. Concerning intentional trust, one needs to distinguish 
between a wide notion of trust, here called reliance, which includes control, of opportunities 
and incentives towards opportunism, and a stronger, narrower notion of ‘real’ trust that goes 
beyond calculative self-interest, on the basis of norms of conduct (integrity), or personal 
bonds of empathy or identification, or routinised conduct. 
In view of this complicatedness of trust, survey questions asking people whether they 
‘generally’ trust others, without specification or qualification, are so unreliable as to be 
useless and misleading. When answering the question, people may have in mind: trust in 
institutions, organizations or individuals; competence trust or (at least two kinds of) 
intentional trust; trust based on control or trust beyond self-interest; and trust under different 
kinds of circumstances. When asked about ‘general’ trust in the police, for example, people 
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may trust the competence of individual officers, but distrust the competence of police 
bureaucracy. They may trust the intentions of the law, and the benevolence of most officers, 
but not their dedication. When asked about their general trust in the police, on which of these 
aspects will they focus to give their answers?       
The notion of trust is filled with paradox. It can go beyond control and calculative self-interest 
but has its limits, depending on external pressures. Trust and control are both substitutes and 
complements. Trust entails lack of information but is also based on information. It can be 
rational, by inference of trustworthiness, but such inference is both limited and enabled by 
social-psychological heuristics that incorporate emotions.    
Trust needs to be pieced together in its multiple dimensions to fit specific conditions. This 
was illustrated with the case of citizen’s trust in the police. There, competence trust suffers 
from the fact that police service is to a large extent a credence good. Judgement of quality 
may then be sought in public reports on performance, preferably by some independent 
agency. It may also be sought in observed proxies of competence such as confident conduct 
and respectable manner and appearance of police officers. Trust in individual police officers 
should be supported by trust in police organization and related institutions, e.g. in their supply 
of sufficient means and training. Concerning intentional trust, hierarchical control is limited 
by weak direct monitoring of conduct. Citizens are subjected to one-sided dependence, so that 
there is limited incentive control by mutual dependence. Both problems can be redressed, to 
some extent, by complaint procedures. However, since control remains weak, trust should 
further be supported by norms of conduct (integrity), enhanced by selection, training and 
police culture, and empathy of officers with respect to citizens. Especially salient, perhaps, is 
that in interaction with the police citizens often find themselves in a loss frame, which 
increases the emotional loading of contacts, and cognitive leaps to preserve self-interest. This 
reduces the reliability of compliant procedures and underlines the importance of confident, 
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i
 This book incorporates an earlier analysis from Nooteboom (1996). 
 
ii
 Strictly speaking, this does not satisfy the condition of asymmetric value of a hostage: the 
poached worker is also of use to the poacher. 
 
iii
 I do not wish to imply that stability of relations is always a good thing economically, in the 
sense that it is always conducive to efficiency and welfare. A certain amount of stability may 
be needed to recoup specific investments, which may in turn be needed to achieve high added 
value and innovativeness. However, relations can become too stable and exclusive and 
thereby yield rigidities. The question therefore is how to develop relations that have optimal 
duration: neither too short nor too long. 
   
iv
 This paragraph is based on a project commissioned by the Dutch Police 
